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W
e live in a world riddled with complexity;
the closer we examine what we think we
know, the more we recognize the limits of our
knowledge. This practice is known as epistemic
humility and, while it is admittedly daunting, it
is one of the most intriguing aspects of science.
While common perceptions of science place sci-
ence on a pedestal of certainty and objectivity,
epistemic humility reveals the inherently un-
certain nature of scientific knowledge. More-
over, there is a disconnect between normative
misconceptions of science as an objective and
certain practice that produces concrete knowl-
edge and the descriptive uncertain nature of
science revealed via epistemic humility. One of
the best ways to help close this epistemic di-
vide is through the incorporation of values and
interdisciplinary practices. By debunking the
myth of absolute objectivity in science and in-
corporating epistemic values, we can further the
conversations about scientific practice and im-
prove our ability to work collaboratively. In
this essay I will argue that not only does re-
jecting the value-free ideal better science, but
it also strengthens interdisciplinary work, which
is becoming increasingly critical in our current
climate of multifaceted issues. To make this
argument, I will begin with an analysis of the
value-free ideal, followed by an evaluation of
interdisciplinarity within science, and conclude
with an extension of the implications of rejecting
the value-free ideal on interdisciplinarity.
In order to understand the rationale behind
rejecting the value-free ideal, we must first un-
derstand its origins and why it is currently con-
sidered to be entrenched in scientific practices.
According to Heather Douglas, an associate pro-
fessor of philosophy at the University of Wa-
terloo, the value-free ideal describes the belief
that only epistemic values, such as generalizabil-
ity and replicability, are acceptable in internal
stages of science in order to preserve ‘objectivity’
(121). Non-epistemic values, such as political
and social views, are separated from the inter-
nal workings of science in accordance with the
value-free ideal. However, as noted by Douglas,
this separation is not attainable nor desirable
in a descriptive or normative context due to its
inaccurate representation of the scientific pro-
cess, influence on manufactured scientific con-
troversies, and impact on our understanding of
objectivity (121).
Douglas’ suggestion of rejecting the value-
free ideal faces the difficult barrier of changing
the public perception of impersonal science that
was established in literature before the 1970s.
Early writing from Robert Menton documented
scientific norms as “impersonality” and “uni-
versalism” (qtd. in Mitroff 579). However,
as further investigation and research was con-
ducted, counter-norms including the “personal
character of science” were established (Mitroff
579). The co-existence of conflicting norms and
counter-norms in science prompted studies that
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examine how science is conducted. One such
study that highlights the need for the incor-
poration of values in science is Ian Mitroff’s
study of Apollo lunar scientists’ behaviours and
reflections about the scientific process. From
the responses of these renowned scientists, three
“commitments” in science arose: an intellectual
commitment, an affective commitment, and an
emotional commitment (Mitroff 586). The com-
bination of epistemic values in the intellectual
commitment and non-epistemic values in the
affective and emotional commitments further
display the “social ambivalence” of science and
the need for the incorporation of values (Mitroff
579). Additionally, the study found that “ev-
ery one of the scientists interviewed. . . indicated
that they thought the notion of the objective
[and] emotionally disinterested scientist na¨ıve”
(Mitroff 587). I believe that the nature of these
commitments and the reflection upon the de-
scriptive nature of emotions influencing science
reinforces Douglas’ rejection of the value-free
ideal.
Secondly, the absolute separation of non-
epistemic values from internal processes of sci-
ence is not attainable. Science is inherently
“value-laden” due to the influence values have
on decisions in science, such as choosing what
to study, how to observe and measure, and how
to mitigate uncertainties (Douglas 122). More-
over, by rejecting the value-free ideal, “we can
better understand the nature of scientific con-
trovers[ies]. . . and help speed [the] resolution of
those controversies” (Douglas 122). Manufac-
tured scientific controversies occur when the
public believes there is scientific dissonance on
a topic when there is in fact consensus within
the technical scientific community (Harker 193).
These controversies stem from miscommunica-
tions and misunderstandings where values ap-
pear to be in conflict. In the anthropogenic
climate change controversy, despite the scientific
community’s overwhelming consensus confirm-
ing anthropogenic climate change, there contin-
ues to be objection on the grounds of natural
variation in weather patterns that some people
“extrapolat[e] to long-term climate patterns”
(Harker 189). This assumption is “enforced by
our knowledge of past climates” and isprob-
lematic as it misaligns the technical terms of
‘weather’ and ‘climate’, and ignores key scien-
tific findings, including increasing levels of green-
house gases (Harker 190). If we were able to
discuss the values that influence our definitions
of weather and climate and overall understand-
ing of manufactured scientific controversies, I
believe we would be able to decrease the number
of misunderstandings that spark manufactured
scientific controversies. By accepting and ac-
knowledging the need for the incorporation of
values in science, we better science by creating
the necessary space for open-minded learning
and discussion.
Douglas’ rejection of the value-free ideal in
scientific practice is reasonable and improves the
quality of practice through her characterizations
objectivity. One of the key concerns with reject-
ing the value-free ideal is the loss of objectivity:
Douglas mitigates this concern by arguing for
the maintenance of concordant objectivity (i.e.
a group agreeing on an outcome) while incorpo-
rating values in science (Douglas 134). Douglas
also shares the following claim from W.O. Quine,
a philosopher renowned for his work on holism,
who states: “The requirement of intersubjec-
tivity is what makes science objective” (qtd. in
Douglas 135). Quine’s argument that objectivity
is attained through intersubjectivity, the notion
that areas of study share more than one disci-
plinary thought, creates a need for another type
of objectivity: interactive objectivity. Interac-
tive objectivity is attained by a group meeting
and discussing what the outcomes should be
and is more successful with the incorporation of
values (Douglas 135). Interactive objectivity is
also an integral aspect of interdisciplinarity as it
promotes interdisciplinary collaboration which
betters science by encouraging a diversity of as
and perspectives explored through the discus-
sion of values and personal qualities. Refuting
the value-free ideal betters both science and in-
terdisciplinarity as it creates space for interactive
objectivity, which improves interdisciplinary col-
laboration.
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To expand upon my argument that reject-
ing the value-free ideal betters science and in-
terdisciplinarity, I will reflect upon academic
disciplines and the meaning of interdisciplinary
work. Academic disciplines are different areas
of “organiz[ed] learning” that are composed of
“accumulated specialist knowledge” and distinct
methods of communication (Krishnan 9). Barri-
ers between disciplines are difficult to define and
incommensurable due to constant change and
complex interactions between disciplines and
sub-disciplines (Krishnan 7). Interdisciplinar-
ity is the process of working between or across
the disciplines, but given the aforementioned
ambiguous definition, its implementation faces
several challenges, including how to determine
when we are crossing the boundary of a disci-
pline (Krishnan 7). Despite the challenges that
disciplinary structure poses to interdisciplinary
work, I believe that it is beneficial to main-
tain disciplines to safeguard the structure of
academia. Academic disciplines have an integral
role in the present education system: educators
worry that the elimination of disciplines would
“demand too much” of students and make it
more difficult to learn; it is difficult to integrate
knowledge without a basic introduction to disci-
plinary knowledge (Krishnan 42). Additionally,
if we were to eliminate disciplines, it would be
challenging to find an instructor with the ex-
pertise to teach more than one subject due to
our current institutionalized disciplines (Krish-
nan 43). Therefore, we must strive to conduct
interdisciplinarity while maintaining the struc-
tural integrity of academic disciplines in order
to effectively better science.
The relationship between structured aca-
demic disciplines and interdisciplinarity is one
of complex dependency; interdisciplinary work
depends on distinct disciplines. This complex
dependency dynamic can pose a threat to effec-
tive interdisciplinary work. To counteract these
challenges, Thaddeus Miller, an assistant pro-
fessor at Arizona State University, and his col-
leagues proposed using epistemological pluralism
as a framework for better interdisciplinarity (So-
cial and Personality Psychology Compass 2018).
Epistemological pluralism is described as “sev-
eral valuable ways of knowing” and is significant
to the argument for interdisciplinary work as
“accommodating plurality leads to a more inte-
grated study” (Miller et al 1). The use of episte-
mological pluralism to better scientific practice is
illustrated in the discipline and subsequent sub-
disciplines of ecology. In her recent address, Dr.
Cari Ficken, a postdoctoral fellow in ecology at
the University of Waterloo, claimed that ecology
is “multicausal”, with many different areas to
consider in its practice (2018). The inherently
interdisciplinary nature of ecological practice
benefits from the framework of epistemic plural-
ism, as the desire for interdisciplinary research
leads to an improved understanding of the multi-
ple epistemologies that influence ecology (Miller
et al 2). But why does interdisciplinarity lead
to an “improved understanding” of sciences such
as ecology? Why is a more integrated study de-
sirable? In the next section of my paper, I will
examine the benefits of interdisciplinary work
and argue that its implementation is desirable
for improvements in science.
Interdisciplinary work is beneficial to science
because it promotes ignorance, a “condition of
knowledge” in which there is an “absence of fact,
understanding, insight or clarity about some-
thing” (Firestein 5). This philosophical notion
of ignorance improves the quality of scientific
knowledge that is attained and disseminated
because it allows for “uncertainty without irri-
tability,” which ignites the production of more
questions, instead of answers (Firestein 17). The
heightened scientific curiosity from question pro-
duction makes scientists ask more and better
questions, leading to new discoveries in science.
In the context of epistemological pluralism, in-
terdisciplinary work includes “unified problem
formulation, sharing methods and the creation
of questions” (Miller et al 3). Considering the
value of creating questions in interdisciplinary
work, ignorance improves scientists’ ability to
work between the disciplines and address in-
creasingly complex and multifaceted problems.
Despite the strength of ignorance in promoting
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interdisciplinarity and subsequent improvements
in science, I have noticed that the “absence of
fact” and ambiguity of ignorance in science is
often met with resistance. Those outside of
the scientific communities, and even including
some scientists, equate science with certainty
and factuality when in reality, science is messy
and operates under various levels of confidence,
not certainty (Afshordi 2018). Further, I believe
we need to exercise caution with the solidifica-
tion of answers in scientific processes and start
valuing curiosity and ambiguity. Answers stop
scientific research, while embracing ambiguity
and curiosity lead to questions that ignite new,
interdisciplinary avenues for research.
Interdisciplinary work betters science
through promoting dialogue between fields,
which can in turn improve our ability to in-
corporate new knowledge and perspectives into
scientific practices. Each scientist approaches
their own science with a personal worldview
and a specific disciplinary literacy that can pre-
vent interdisciplinary studies and collaboration
(Eigenbrode et al. 57). If we employ interdisci-
plinary practices and start to value the diversity
of perspectives, scientists can gain new knowl-
edge from a wide variety of disciplinary and
personal ideologies that better the production
and dissemination of knowledge in their respec-
tive disciplines, thus improving the quality of
science.
Having explained the concepts of disciplines
and interdisciplinarity in the context of episte-
mological pluralism, and the benefits of func-
tioning between disciplines, I can now connect
the value-free ideal to interdisciplinary work. In
doing so, I will reveal how rejecting the value-
free ideal betters interdisciplinary work and, as
a result, science. Rejecting the value-free ideal
improves interdisciplinarity as it eases the dis-
cussion of divergent worldviews to further in-
terdisciplinary collaboration. The discussion of
divergent worldviews and connection of values
to interdisciplinary collaboration is facilitated in
the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative. The Toolbox
Dialogue Initiative (TDI) is a conversation tool
that individuals use to enhance understanding
of each person’s values in order to promote re-
spect and effective communication in interdisci-
plinary work (Michigan State University 2019).
The focus on collaborative communication in
the TDI promotes interactive objectivity as it
establishes a method to mediate a conversation,
allowing a group to determine how their values
will shape the success of their project. In addi-
tion to encouraging interactive objectivity, the
TDI functions to prevent one of the main barri-
ers to interdisciplinary work: “interdisciplinary
illiteracy” (Collins and Evans 29). “Interdisci-
plinary illiteracy” is the inability to speak the
technical language of another discipline. Using
the conversation tool promoted by the TDI im-
proves one’s ability to communicate between the
disciplines, ameliorating the practice of interdis-
ciplinarity in science (Collins and Evans 29).
Rejecting the value-free ideal also improves
our ability to function within ignorance, which,
as previously explained, improves interdisci-
plinary efforts. Given that science is often
mistakenly associated with objectivity and cer-
tainty, rejecting the value-free ideal would en-
courage ignorance, therefore improving the facili-
tation of curiosity and focusing on the ‘certainty’
produced by answers. Furthermore, by incorpo-
rating epistemic and non-epistemic values, we
are able to embrace the natural ambiguity of sci-
ence and promote ignorance, which betters both
science and interdisciplinarity.
While the previous sections of this paper
have focused on why rejecting the value-free ideal
improves science and interdisciplinary work, I
will now briefly reflect as to how we could dis-
regard the value-free ideal in contemporary sci-
entific practices. I believe that one of the best
ways to accomplish this is to be critically con-
scious of our social locations. Your social loca-
tion describes where you are positioned in the
“hierarchically structured system of power re-
lations” in society and is strengthened by your
recognition of this position (Wylie 31). If sci-
entists heightened their sensitivity towards their
social locations and the social domains in which
4
they conducted scientific research, I believe we
would achieve improved philosophical ignorance
and scientific research.
Additionally, acknowledging social location
can improve one’s ability to critically assess the
knowledge they are presented. Acknowledging
the reflective and philosophical nature of this
paper, I note the limitations of my social loca-
tion and in expressing alternative arguments and
perspectives. I am writing this paper as a young,
female student and recognize that my identity
directly influences how I interact with knowledge
(Wylie 27). I am limited in what I know by who
I am. For future iterations of this paper, I be-
lieve that collaboration and the incorporation of
other voices would be beneficial in strengthening
the argument for the incorporation of values in
science and the promotion of interdisciplinarity.
In conclusion, rejecting the value-free ideal
promotes better science and interdisciplinary
work due to the “value-laden” nature of science.
Rejecting this ideal leads to an improved ability
to function in ignorance, and to the encourage-
ment of interdisciplinary dialogue that creates
more space for interdisciplinary work. As a stu-
dent studying in the interdisciplinary program
of Knowledge Integration, I am pursuing in-
terdisciplinary approaches to my learning and
knowledge. I have noticed that my knowledge of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
from my Legal Studies course strengthens my
understanding of policies (or lack thereof) sur-
rounding euthanasia that have been discussed
in my biomedical ethics course. Connections
between courses have reinforced my recognition
of the complexity of modern problems and the
benefits of an interdisciplinary approach to these
problems. While striving for interdisciplinarity
in my studies may not yield the same depth of
knowledge produced in disciplinary studies, I
believe that there is great value to the breadth
of my knowledge. My understanding of igno-
rance and the importance of values in knowledge
acquisition has allowed me to make connections
between disciplines and operate under ambiguity
successfully. I believe a deep, disciplinary knowl-
edge base would hinder this success due to its
promotion of a singular method to approaching a
problem that would instead benefit from diverse
perspectives. Additionally, my pursuit of inter-
disciplinary practices has helped me maintain
epistemic humility. I recognize that my peers
who are pursuing studies in specific disciplines,
such as law or ethics, will have more detailed and
in-depth knowledge. These peers, however, may
lack the ability of an interdisciplinary student
to translate their knowledge across disciplinary
boundaries, thus limiting the extent to which
they can apply their knowledge. I look forward
to continuing my pursuit of interdisciplinarity
and working in a world of increasing complexity
and beautiful uncertainty.
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